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Abstract The 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (P.L. 111- 148), or 
ACA, requires that U.S. citizens either purchase health insurance or pay a fine. To 
offset the financial burden for lower- income households, it also provides subsidies 
to ensure that health insurance premiums are affordable. However, relatively little 
work has been done on how such affordability standards should be set. The existing 
literature on affordability is not grounded in social norms and has methodological 
and theoretical flaws. To address these issues, we developed a series of hypothetical 
vignettes in which individual and household sociodemographic characteristics were 
varied. We then convened a panel of eighteen experts with extensive experience in 
affordability standards to evaluate the extent to which each vignette character could 
afford to pay for one of two health insurance plans. The panel varied with respect to 
political ideology and discipline. We find that there was considerable disagreement 
about how affordability is defined. There was also disagreement about what might be 
included in an affordability standard, with substantive debate surrounding whether 
savings, debt, education, or single parenthood is relevant. There was also substan-
tial variation in experts’ assessed affordability scores. Nevertheless, median expert 
affordability assessments were not far from those of ACA.
The 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (P.L. 111- 148), or 
ACA, requires that U.S. citizens purchase health insurance or pay a fine, 
but it also provides subsidies to make health insurance premiums afford-
able for the less affluent (White House 2010). Affordability, as used in 
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public policy, is a normative concept describing how much people in a 
given society typically believe others should pay for a good or service. 
This concept necessarily accounts for the financial resources needed to 
maintain a minimally acceptable standard of living. But defining a mini-
mal standard of living is an inherently subjective process.
Because affordability is a normative standard, it can be challenging to 
assess. To date, two main strategies have been used assess the affordabil-
ity of health insurance: behavioral analysis and surveys of the uninsured 
population (Bundorf and Pauly 2006; Blumberg et al. 2007; KFF 2009). 
These approaches, though, do not adequately capture differences in sub-
jective views of affordability, particularly in the context of a reformed 
health care system.
We report on the results of an analysis using an alternative strategy — a 
Delphi experiment — that elicited the views of a panel of experts.
Existing Methods to Evaluate Affordability
Behavioral Approach
There are two main strategies used to assess health insurance affordabil-
ity. One strategy is to examine data on the current behavior of similarly 
situated people. This approach, initially developed by Bundorf and Pauly 
(2006), who call it a behavioral definition, suggests that health insurance 
is affordable to a family if 50 percent or more of similarly situated fami-
lies purchase insurance. Their definition of similarly situated incorporates 
family income, family composition, and measures of the price of health 
insurance (either prices themselves or expected expenditures, unadjusted 
for geography). Blumberg and colleagues (2007) adopted a similar stan-
dard in their analysis of affordability, which contributed to the develop-
ment of the standard used in Massachusetts’s health reform law.
The behavioral approach, however, has three problems. First, unob-
served heterogeneity in the prices faced by different families (both those 
in the group and nongroup health insurance markets) makes this calcula-
tion empirically suspect (Bradley 2008). For example, people who do not 
hold coverage but who appear to be able to afford it may work in jobs that 
do not provide health insurance coverage. They may also work in jobs that 
offer coverage with very high premium sharing. On the other hand, those 
who hold coverage may be employed in jobs that offer coverage with low 
premium sharing. For these reasons, it is particularly challenging to iden-
tify insured “nonafforders” using available data. Information on insurance 
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premiums can be used to impute a price of insurance for those who are 
uninsured, but no available data provide information on the price of insur-
ance paid by those who currently hold coverage.
Second, the behavioral approach elides the normative nature of the ques-
tion. Some people who could (normatively) afford to purchase coverage 
may not be willing to pay the full price of such coverage. People’s will-
ingness to pay might be depressed for many reasons, including the local 
availability of free care or because they are healthy and do not believe that 
they might one day become ill.
On the other hand, some of those people who purchase insurance may 
well be unable to afford it according to normative notions of affordabil-
ity (Glied 2009). Such people may be willing to do without other merit 
goods in order to buy health insurance, though society as a whole may not 
view those individual decisions as optimal. There is no reason to believe 
that uninsured “afforders” and insured “nonafforders” balance out at the 
population median.
Finally, individual willingness to pay for coverage under the current 
health insurance system may not reflect societal norms about affordabil-
ity under a reformed system. For example, the current health insurance 
system incorporates risk rating and does not constrain medical loss ratios. 
Some might feel that people cannot “afford” to pay premiums that vary 
with risk or that contribute significantly to insurance company profits, 
whether or not they are willing to do so. Alternatively, some people might 
feel that an affordability standard under a system in which people are 
compelled to purchase a defined health insurance package should be well 
below what they would pay if they were choosing coverage freely.
Survey approach
A second strategy to determine standards of affordability is to survey 
members of the public. Most surveys to date focus on perceptions of 
affordability among the uninsured. In the late 1990s, Yegian and col-
leagues conducted a survey of the nonpoor uninsured in California, ask-
ing questions about willingness to pay for coverage and about the cost of 
coverage. They found that there was a considerable mismatch between 
respondents’ assessments of the cost of coverage and the actual cost of 
coverage and that willingness to pay for different types of plans did not 
match well to differences in premiums (Yegian et al. 2000).
The Kaiser Family Foundation as part of its tracking polls also sur-
veyed uninsured Americans on how much they could afford to pay for 
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coverage (KFF 2009). The median respondent in the foundation’s survey 
reported that he or she could afford to pay about $100 per month for cov-
erage. Unfortunately, these data do not provide enough information to see 
how affordability varies with income or with health plan characteristics.
Moreover, the survey estimates suffer from some of the same prob-
lems as the behavioral estimates. They do not provide insight into soci-
ety’s normative preferences, they do not consider affordability under a 
reformed system, and they are likely to be quite inaccurate because most 
respondents have very little understanding of the price of health insurance 
(Yegian et al. 2000). Some of these issues can be tackled by eliciting the 
respondents’ opinion of others’ ability to pay (e.g., by using vignettes) and 
by varying plan characteristics.
Conceptual Framework
While the “ideal” democratic public policy practice privileges the voice 
of the people, democracy highly values an informed and deliberative citi-
zenry. It is under these conditions of increasing the public’s knowledge, as 
well as that of the policy makers who represent them, that subject matter 
experts can be viewed as most useful. The traditional policy- analysis view 
is that experts should base their policy advice on an assimilation of exist-
ing literature and, after thorough analysis and assessment of existing evi-
dence, offer an informed “objective” opinion (Weimer and Vining 2005).1 
While many scholars question such claims of objectivity, they at the same 
time acknowledge how a host of policy questions can benefit from expert 
analysis and accumulated knowledge. One view of such benefits is that 
experts can “speak truth to power.” Some argue that as outsiders experts 
may be able to bring a more neutral perspective to muddy or politically 
charged concepts (Price 1965). Examining the process of expert delibera-
tion and decision making provides insights on the extent to which this is 
an accurate characterization of what experts do.
In the area of setting affordability thresholds, bureaucrats will heavily 
influence how the individual mandate and subsidies are implemented and 
in turn shape higher- level decisions about affordability thresholds. Like 
policy makers, bureaucrats often seek the advice of subject matter experts. 
While this is not a study of bureaucratic behavior and decision making, 
understanding how experts think through this issue will help illuminate 
their potential influence on the policy process.
1. In the case of affordability standards, this literature would include studies of behavioral 
affordability and of subjective preferences.
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Methods
We recruited an interdisciplinary panel of experts in social policy who 
could provide assessments of affordability (see technical documentation).2 
We used a modified policy Delphi process to elicit the panel’s opinions 
on coverage affordability (Linstone and Turoff 1975; Fowles and Fowles 
1978). In our implementation of the Delphi method, experts were asked 
to respond to a series of vignettes designed to elicit responses to complex 
problems (see technical documentation for a sample of vignette materi-
als). The results of the initial responses to these vignettes were then sum-
marized and returned to the expert panelists, who were asked to reassess 
their responses in light of this feedback (Fowles and Fowles 1978). The 
usefulness of this method depends on the quality of the experts who form 
the panel and on the extent to which they have appropriate information 
that can help them shape their opinions (Linstone and Turoff 1975; Fowles 
and Fowles 1978).
To help ensure a quality expert panel, we first generated a broad list 
of researchers and practitioners who have grappled with the concept of 
affordability. The authors and a research assistant obtained names from 
publications, from public and private agencies, and from other colleagues 
familiar with affordability debates. Once our team had obtained a broad 
list of approximately forty researchers and practitioners, our research 
team subjectively sorted the experts by political leaning (where applica-
ble), practical experience, theoretical experience, and academic discipline. 
Ultimately, twenty- five experts were invited, and eighteen attended. To 
increase the likelihood that experts devoted adequate time and attention 
to the task, they were provided an honorarium of $1,000 each. The partici-
pant list included people with widely recognized expertise in studying and 
delivering social services including housing, food, and income support 
services, as well as health insurance.
The Delphi approach allows for assessments of which sociodemographic 
characteristics might be important in considering such a standard. This 
allows for direct comparisons with the ACA affordability standard, which 
ranges from 3 percent of household income for families at 150 percent of 
the federal poverty level (FPL) to a maximum of 9.5 percent of household 
income for families earning more than 400 percent of the FPL. The meet-
ing of experts was held after the rough outline of ACA had been drafted 
and deliberated but before passage of the law.
We provided each of the eighteen experts with a series of sixty- one 
2. The technical documentation is available online at www.pceo.org/Affordability.pdf.
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vignettes briefly describing the living situations of fictitious households 
(see table 1). Vignettes were used to facilitate proxy responses from each 
participant. Proxy responses are particularly important for making norma-
tive judgments (Alves and Rossi 1978), allowing the participant to con-
sider how different characteristics of a household might influence his or 
her sense of what that household might afford to pay. By providing a ref-
erent or proxy, vignettes can help facilitate decision making by out lining 
parameters around which subjective assessments can be made. Prior 
research suggests that experts can reasonably rate 120 – 150 permutations 
of vignettes (Normand, Frank, and McGuire 2002). The vignettes are 
presented in the technical documentation;3 however, one sample vignette 
follows:
George is fifty- five years old. He is married and has grown children. 
His household’s annual income is $28,600. He lives outside Iowa City 
and pays rent of $475 monthly.
These vignettes incorporated characteristics of the hypothetical house-
holds, including age, household income, marital status, presence of chil-
dren, health conditions, the presence of debt or savings, and housing costs. 
The vignettes varied within and across these characteristics. For instance, 
characters were presented as either twenty- five or fifty- five years of age 
(the typical postcollege and preretirement period), single or married, and 
with no children or two children. In all vignettes with children, we speci-
fied that the children received free coverage through the Children’s Health 
Insurance Program, as would be the case for most recipients of govern-
ment subsidies.
We also defined two different health insurance plans. The first plan (A) 
has a $2,000 annual deductible, 15 percent cost sharing, and a $3000 out-
 of- pocket maximum. The second plan (B) has no deductible, a $20 office 
visit co- pay, and a $50 hospital co- pay with a $1,000 out- of- pocket maxi-
mum. In both plans, all preventive services were provided free of charge.
After sending out the background information, we created a Web sur-
vey in which we asked each expert to score his or her responses to each 
of the sixty- one vignettes (organized in random order) for each of the two 
health insurance plans (a total of 122 affordability scores per respondent). 
The experts were asked to specify how much the fictional household in 
each vignette could afford to pay monthly for each plan. For single- person 
3. Even though plan administrators will be told they cannot implement risk rating, some 
experts may advise states to set affordability levels based on risk- related attributes.
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Table 1 Characteristics of the Vignette Characters
Characteristica Values Frequency
Age 25  29
 55 32
Marital status Single 29
 Married 32
Children No children 40




Savings $0 53 
 $35,000 8
Child from previous relationship? No 59
 Yes 2
Spouse does not have an income-earning job No 59
 Yes 2
Did not complete high school No 59
 Yes 2
Graduated college No 59
 Yes 2






Lives in Chicago No 57
 Yes 4
Lives in Iowa City No 52
 Yes 9
Lives in Austin No 57
 Yes 4







Note: See technical appendix for the vignettes. For instance, one vignette took the following 
form: “James is 55 years old. He lives alone. His household income is $35,600.”
aThese characteristics were used to ascertain the impact of each parameter on experts’ per-
ceived affordability of two hypothetical health insurance policies.
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households, experts could select a score ranging from $0 to $800. For 
married households, experts could select scores ranging from $0 to $1,600 
to reflect the cost of coverage for the couple. The experts were also given 
the option of describing any rules they used in calculating their afford-
ability scores and were offered the chance to explain their scoring for each 
vignette.
In October 2009 the panel and the Columbia University researchers 
met in New York City to present, explain, and debate what affordability 
means. This discussion was in part generalized and in part guided by 
respondents’ first round of scoring data. Each panelist received a statisti-
cal summary of the results of the full panel and of their own responses 
to each vignette. They then discussed discordant cases in the survey and 
expressed their views about which characteristics should affect any stan-
dard of affordability. After the discussion, the panelists were asked to 
individually and independently rerate their scores using the new informa-
tion and to describe how their decision rules had changed. The hope was 
that the final rating scores would be enhanced by the deliberations among 
the experts in the interdisciplinary panel.
By asking the experts to describe how their decision rules had changed, 
in theory, we will not only be able to obtain a formal quantitative assess-
ment of the determinants of an affordability standard using the Delphi 
method but also a qualitative understanding of what leading experts think 
about when considering such a standard. This qualitative analysis is based 
on transcript data from discussions about the affordability scores at the 
half- day conference.
Statistical Analyses
With respect to the numerical data generated, we assess factors affecting 
affordability determinations using median regression models to reduce 
skewing due to outliers. The standard errors for within- respondent correla-
tions were estimated via bootstrapping. To capture how affordability assess-
ments varied with income, the regression analyses interacted income with 
income categories relative to the FPL (150 – 200 percent FPL, 200 – 250 
percent FPL, etc). The analysis was then repeated including all other house-
hold characteristics incorporated in the vignettes in addition to income. We 
also conducted ordinary least squares regression to highlight how the mean 
may differ from the median. The mean and median values provide useful 
information surrounding magnitude and distribution of expert- opinion out-
put. Regressions were run with individuals as fixed effects.
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Results
Rules of Thumb
Many of the panelists found the task of assessing the affordability of 
coverage for each of the sixty- one households described in the vignettes 
rather daunting. Several spent over five hours determining the appropriate 
standards. Ultimately, each panelist was asked to derive and write down 
some rule of thumb that would ensure consistency across the responses. 
In many cases, these rules were quite complex:
Respondent A: Rent at 30% of income unless otherwise specified; taxes 
at 20 – 30% of income depending on family size and poverty level; food 
costs adjusted . . . Plan A — put aside $250/mo to handle deductible; Plan 
B – put aside $83/month to handle deductible; transportation costs . . . 
[including] gas — usually at $500 – $600/month; included misc item — 
which accounted for clothing, recreation, entertainment, pharmacy 
(if not separately noted).
Respondent B: I used a formula that accounted [for] income, taxes, 
numbers of adults and children at home, debt, savings, child support 
payments, location, maximum out- of- pocket medical expenses, and 
my normative views on minimum consumption of housing, food, and 
other goods.
Respondent C: I divided the cases into four groups, defined by the 
household income divided by the number of people to be covered . . . 
I then divided these groups into those with household heads over 40 
and those under 40 and “charged” 1% more for those over 40 on the 
grounds that medical costs go up as one ages. . . . I followed the same 
principle (age grading and one versus two covered persons) for the 
second income category (4% for single people under 40, 5% for a 
couple under forty, 5% for a single over 40 and 6% for a couple over 
40). And so on, up the income continuum.
Others used less complex rules and relied on data, similar to the 
approach provided by Blumberg et al. (2007) described above. The idea is 
to base the estimates on the amount households spend on health insurance 
relative to their overall income. At the meeting held at Columbia Univer-
sity, some of the expert rules of thumb were collectively discussed.
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In- Person Discussion
What Does Affordability Mean? The discussion started in earnest with a 
review of the vignettes, beginning with Sarah, a vignette character who 
earns $1610 a month, just under 200 percent of the FPL. In the case of 
characters with very low earnings, such as Sarah, there was considerable 
agreement among the panelists. All but one of the experts thought that she 
should pay something for health insurance, and all agreed that it should 
be very little.
The discussion heated up when participants considered Jessica, who 
earns $2,210 per month. Here it was revealed that some participants inter-
preted affordability as what the person should pay and others as what they 
could pay. This provided a jumping- off point to a broader discussion of 
what affordability means.
One participant suggested that Jessica could “literally” afford $800 per 
month, and denounced affordability as “a lousy policy where you impov-
erish people so they can buy a minimal set of other goods after they end 
up paying for health insurance.” Another respondent who also gave a very 
high affordability threshold noted, “I’m not saying it would be worth it 
for her to pay this much, but she could still manage reasonably well if she 
[did] . . . so.” Many others disagreed with this literal interpretation, noting, 
“I don’t think literal affordability is an interesting policy.” One respondent 
described affordability as “asking really, ‘How much could one reasonably 
pay for health insurance.’ ” Several others argued that a policy would be 
affordable for beneficiaries if there would “be no adverse consequences by 
pushing them to that limit.” (However, the specific adverse consequences 
mentioned in this context were not actually discussed.)
Those who disagreed with the literal definition generally emphasized 
the importance of a variety of nonhealth- related “merit” goods that public 
policy makers would want low- income families to be able to purchase. For 
example, one respondent noted, “There are a number of things I want peo-
ple to save for besides having to worry about paying for health insurance.” 
Another stated, “In theory, if there’s a minimum amount of resources you 
need to live, we should look at [an] amount over and above that minimum 
amount.” One participant, who argued that the standard should be $100 
to $150, said, “I’m a low- ball guy because [I take into account] the real 
costs of living, the fact that the poverty line is too low, etc.” Some specific 
examples of merit goods were discussed, but these were generally only 
discussed to highlight the need to be comprehensive in one’s assessment. 
For example, a car for transit to work was considered a merit good by 
some experts.
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Participants then noted that even the boundaries between could and 
should blurred. The group discussed various definitions, including, 
respectively, what one is “able” to pay and what one “ought” to pay given 
his or her financial circumstances. Perhaps the closest approximation to 
a normative model came from a panelist who advanced what Carla Saenz 
(2010) calls a “reasonable trade- off” definition of affordability, to wit, 
“what one ought to be paying in relation to the bundle of other minimal 
goods.” As noted above, such minimal goods need not be limited to those 
basic to survival but rather those needed to maintain an acceptable stan-
dard of living.
Different notions of affordability arose because panelists were given 
the opportunity to define affordability in their own way prior to the meet-
ing. They were not asked to devise lists of what might be called a merit 
good and what might not. Therefore, the Delphi round during the meet-
ing provided the opportunity to refine each expert’s own personal notions 
of affordability standards. Still, attempts to bridge the gap by formulat-
ing general principles that might guide the definition and application of 
affordability were surprisingly tentative. One panelist insisted that “skin 
in the game” made for better consumers. In other words, the panelist felt 
that those who actually made investments in health care out of their own 
pockets would choose more cost- effective insurance options than those 
who were fully subsidized. The panelist further noted that the idea that 
individuals above 200 percent FPL might legitimately be required to pay 
more than a negligible amount, while those below that threshold should 
pay little or nothing, had broad intuitive appeal. However, this panelist did 
not state how steep the gradient after this threshold should be.
At one point, participants considered the question of how high the 
threshold for subsidies should be drawn, noting that the median income is 
about 400 percent of the FPL. Some questioned whether we really want 
to be subsidizing half of the population, and others suggested that the 
threshold should be even higher because insurance is so expensive. One 
participant noted, “In Massachusetts, there’s a problem where many peo-
ple whose incomes are above 300 percent FPL can’t buy health insurance 
and by appealing they’ve been deemed that they can’t afford it and [can] 
get a waiver.” This participant’s observation suggests that assessments of 
affordability should be evaluated on an ongoing basis.
Another dimension of affordability that arose in the responses and dis-
cussion was the time frame over which decisions are made. One partici-
pant emphasized that avoiding undue dislocation and disruption in people’s 
financial lives was important: “In the real world people make financial 
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commitments associated with their inflows and they are not changeable 
immediately, and we’re talking about an immediate change and the notion 
that they could adjust all other expenses that they’ve already locked in for 
their standard of living and they now should back off of that for health 
insurance; that’s not affordability.”
All panelists made adjustments for family size and composition, but the 
method of adjustment and the adjustment size varied substantially among 
panelists. When panelists spoke of adjustments for family size, one panelist 
noted, “I didn’t charge twice as much [when there was another adult who 
could pay] but just adjusted a fixed rate for the additional person.” Another 
noted that adjustments could be nuanced, pointing out that her preferred 
schedule allows more income for families with children under age five (i.e., 
a lower affordability threshold) than for those with children over five years 
of age, because there is a burden associated with caring for children who 
are not yet in school. This, in turn, raises questions about whether to adjust 
for the receipt of other social benefits, such as Head Start.
Complex Family Circumstances. There was even less agreement about 
how to address other dimensions of the vignettes. Many respondents 
did not incorporate variation in housing costs in their estimates. Some 
argued that these variations were discretionary, while others claimed that 
adjusting for such variations would be politically unpalatable. But several 
respondents asserted that housing costs should be reflected in affordabil-
ity calculations for public policy reasons, noting, for example, “you don’t 
want to force people into more dangerous housing just to afford health 
insurance.”
About one- third of respondents thought that savings were an impor-
tant consideration, but fewer thought that debt was important. The general 
tenor of discussion, as well as the premeeting responses, held that debt 
should not be taken to diminish ability to pay, in part because policy mak-
ers should not be encouraging debt accrual. However, possible reasons for 
debt gave some respondents pause. For example, one respondent stated, 
“I did not view credit card debt as a worthy factor — unless there were an 
indication it was due to medical out- of- pocket expenses (expenses directly 
paid for medical care from the recipient).” While no one specifically fol-
lowed up on this comment, many experts seemed to feel that this was an 
important consideration. Similarly, most respondents did not alter their 
overall assessment that savings should not be taken into account, arguing, 
“I would not punish her for having savings.” After the meeting, however, 
a few respondents altered their responses, with respondents who did not 
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provide a score for savings and debt indicating that they would in fact 
incorporate such considerations. One such respondent noted that in the 
real world “debt and savings would have an effect on affordability.”
Others suggested that other variables, such as the individual’s age, 
might be considered. People in their fifties use three times more health 
care than do those in their twenties, it was pointed out, and should there-
fore perhaps pay more.3 Other participants, however, emphasized the need 
for older households to save for retirement and for later medical expenses. 
One respondent pointed out, “A couple needs more than $100,000 just 
to pay Medicare premiums . . . so I took savings into account for those 
[nearing] Medicare age.” Other panelists agreed, citing the danger of 
unintended consequences from uncritical applications of affordability. “If 
fifty- five- year- olds are charged more [than younger people], then they’ll 
suddenly show up for food stamps,” said one. One participant noted the 
impracticality of incorporating savings, age, or other such considerations: 
“I can’t imagine a plan that uses individual debt in determining affordabil-
ity and what someone should pay.” Another noted, “I tried to completely 
minimize discretionary behavior in calculating this, but some could say 
that [even] having kids is a discretionary decision.” Presumably, the first 
respondent was referring to the administrative barriers to implementing a 
complex standard of affordability, and the second respondent was refer-
ring to the political barriers to doing so.
Plan Choices and Affordability. Each vignette asked participants to 
decide between the basic and the more comprehensive health plan. This 
led to a discussion about how affordability related to choice of plan design. 
Clearly, a person’s health determined whether it was logical to pay more 
for a plan without a deductible. For example, one respondent argued that 
generous subsidy of the higher deductible plan would be preferred even 
for people with chronic conditions because such cost- sharing provides 
incentives for good chronic- disease maintenance: “I feel that the policy 
will push [vignette character] to better control her asthma and avoid hos-
pitalization and reduce M.D. visits.” Others disagreed, asserting that the 
affordability thresholds for the two plans should be set so as to encour-
age enrollment in the more generous, lower cost- sharing plan. Such an 
incentive would encourage less risk taking with respect to unforeseen 
catastrophic medical expenses. For instance, one expert noted, “For low-
 income people [the basic plan] would be a waste of money because it 
increases exposure to out- of- pocket expenses, [raising concerns about 
affordability].”
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Determining affordability thresholds for different plan choices raised 
questions again about the role of debt and savings in these determina-
tions. Many respondents argued that households with more savings would 
be better able to afford the basic plan with higher deductibles and cost 
sharing: “For me, the price differential was smaller if I felt someone had 
savings to serve as their insurance to protect against larger out- of- pocket 
costs.” Debt in relation to plan cost was not discussed.
Expert Affordability Scores
After the meeting, the participants were asked to reevaluate their afford-
ability assessments for each of the vignettes. Despite the lively discussion 
and the divergent opinions voiced, most participants made only minor 
revisions to their premeeting affordability scores. It should be noted that 
core beliefs surrounding what is and is not normative with respect to 
affordability assessments are unlikely to be altered in a half- day meet-
ing. However, one might expect greater variation in second- round scoring 
given that some respondents changed their own definitions of affordability 
that they had brought with them to the meeting. The final scores were used 
in our affordability estimates.
While most experts thought subsidy levels should be progressively rated 
with income, there was substantial divergence in expert opinion with 
respect to exact quantification of the affordability standard (see fig. 1). If 
we look at the median score offered among experts, we find that afford-
able monthly health insurance payments were considered to be about $50 
for households at 150 percent of the FPL to around $325 at 400 percent of 
the FPL for the more- basic plan A (with substantial cost sharing) and to a 
high of roughly $425 per month for the more- comprehensive plan B. This 
corresponds to 3.4 percent of income at 150 – 200 percent of the FPL and 
7.4 percent of income at 350 – 400 percent of the FPL.
Note, however, that these levels simply reflect the median meaning that 
half of the experts thought affordable payments should be below these lev-
els, while the remaining half believed affordable monthly payments could 
be set higher. There was substantial divergence between the 25th and 75th 
percentile scores, especially for vignette characters with higher earnings. 
The mean value was significantly higher than the median value — skewed 
much closer to the 75th percentile score — reflecting the wide variation in 
affordability opinions for persons earning around $88,000 annually (400 
percent of FPL for a family of four in 2010). Given that median household 
income in 2009 was about $50,000 and median family income for a fam-
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Figure 1A Expert-Generated Affordability Scores by Federal Poverty 
Level, Plan A
Figure 1B Expert-Generated Affordability Scores by Federal Poverty 
Level, Plan B
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ily of four in 2010 was $72,0004 (a value that is substantially below 400 
percent of the FPL for a family of four), this means some experts believe 
government subsidies should remain fairly generous for middle- income 
Americans, while others believe that subsidies should be set very low.
To provide a general picture of how experts thought affordability scores 
should be adjusted according to increases in income as well as the other 
household characteristics discussed qualitatively above, we conducted 
regressions of the mean and median affordability scores on income by 
FPL category (see table 2). Median affordability scores suggest that each 
additional dollar in income should produce a $0.12 increase in payments 
for health insurance. Experts, at the median, also felt that singles should 
be penalized with a $47 additional payment for insurance, but that having 
children should reduce payments by $99. Moreover, the “median expert” 
opined that marital status, family size, type of insurance, and spousal 
employment were all relevant in affordability determinations. Moreover, 
the variation in affordability scores (e.g., the higher subsidies for those 
who live in expensive cities, such as Chicago), while not statistically sig-
nificant, suggests that at least some experts felt strongly about many of the 
other sociodemographic factors presented in the vignettes.
Table 3 provides the median regressions relative to the ACA and Mas-
sachusetts affordability standards. The median affordability scores were 
not far from those stipulated by the ACA and were within range of those 
used in Massachusetts. While the expert panel felt that the average person 
living at between 100 – 150 percent of the FPL could afford to spend 3.4 
percent of his or her income on health insurance, the corresponding range 
for 100 – 150 percent of the federal poverty level for the Massachusetts 
plan is 2.5 percent – 3.7 percent and 4 percent to 6.3 percent for the ACA. 
Both the Massachusetts and ACA thresholds were somewhat higher than 
the respondent assessments for households with higher incomes.
While regressions on the median scores are useful to grasp a general 
picture of expert opinion, these median values also mask variation in the 
factors that matter among experts. To illuminate this variation, we con-
ducted regression analyses for each individual expert and then counted 
the number of experts whose score for a given vignette characteristic was 
statistically significant. This allows us to determine not only which indi-
vidual characteristics experts view as important when assessing afford-
ability but also the extent to which experts vary with respect to afford-
4. The exact figures are $49,777 and $72,352, respectively, according to the U.S. census 
extracted on March 2, 2011.
Table 2 The Effect of Various Vignette Characteristics on the Mean and 
Median Affordability Scores (robust t statistics)
 Monthly Amount Affordable 
  Mean regression Median regression
Income 0.17 0.12a
  (0.04)** (0.02)**
Single 8.72 46.62
  (27.79) (14.01)**
Two children? –75.63 –98.50
  (22.40)** (30.83)**
Single × two children –45.99 –5.52
  (31.62) (20.11)
Income squared –5.73E-06 –9.67E-07
  (4.03E-06) (2.41E-06)
Plan –71.41 –60.00
  (9.50)** (13.31)**
Debt? –7.33 3.96
  (6.10) (9.13)
Savings? 18.67 12.37
  (5.97)** (6.86)
Child from previous relationship –32.40 –6.31
 (8.64)** (12.52)
Spouse does not have job 19.95 46.65
 (10.19) (15.35)**
Did not complete high school 21.91 4.92
 (15.93) (14.65)
Graduated from college 30.15 17.996
  (18.79) (9.46)
Excellent health? 29.94 22.23
  (13.29)* (11.34)
Asthma? 0.47 –10.24
  (9.54) (8.71)
Hypertension? –1.96 –3.61
  (6.71) (12.55)
Lives in Chicago –0.28 –319.36
  (163.47) (182.88)
Lives in Iowa City 18.77 –80.21
  (49.83) (54.05)
Lives in Austin 29.38 –185.65
  (109.80) (108.24)
Drives to work 14.92 –8.04
  (17.95) (15.44)
Owns home –0.02 0.23
  (0.12) (0.13)
Constant –132.20 –140.51
  (41.34)** (42.66)**
Observations 2195 2195
R-squared 0.18 
Note: Values are in US$ and errors are clustered.
aFor every additional dollar increase in income, the experts felt that the vignette characters 
should pay 12 cents more for their insurance premiums.
*Significant at 5 percent; **significant at 1 percent
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ability scores — and how (increasing or decreasing the score) — for each 
characteristic.
Of the eighteen experts, the majority believed income, marital status 
(single), and plan choice should be used to determine affordability levels 
(see table 4). There was almost complete agreement (sixteen out of eigh-
teen) that payments should increase as income increases and that monthly 
premium payments should be lower if individuals choose the basic plan 
(A). On average, these sixteen experts believed payments should increase 
20 cents for every $1 increase in earnings, whereas the basic plan A should 
be about $80 cheaper than the comprehensive plan (B). While the major-
ity of experts thought marital status should be considered in establish-
ing affordability levels, there was more variation in opinion: six experts 
thought it should not be used, and two experts believed monthly payments 
should be substantially lower for singles.
Table 3 Median Regression Score Relative to the Massachusetts 
Affordability Standard for 2010 and the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act Standard for 2014
Income as a    Patient Protection 
Share of the   Massachusetts  and Affordable 
Federal Poverty  Median Affordability Care Act 
Level (by %) Regression (2010)a (2014)b
150–200  0.034 0.025–0.037 0.04–0.063
 (0.011)*  
200–250 0.047 0.038–0.056 0.063–0.0805
 (0.011)*  
250–300 0.057 0.047–0.07 0.0805–0.095c
 (0.008)*  
300–350 0.065 0.07(a) 0.095c
 (0.007)*  
350–400 0.074 — 0.095c
 (0.007)*  
Constant 9.813  
 (23.222)  
Observations 2195  
aPremium contributions based on analysis of Massachusetts Health Care Reform Law and 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (P.L. 111-148) as amended.
bCalculated as share of least costly health plan offered by Connector as share of income at 
300 percent of the federal poverty level.
cIndividuals are not subject to mandate penalties if premium costs exceed 8 percent of 
household income. 
*Significant at p < 0.001
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While half of the experts did not adjust payments to account for chil-
dren, the remaining nine experts thought the presence of children in the 
household should be used as a major determinant of plan affordability. 
All nine thought monthly payments should be reduced according to the 
presence of children, with the average reporting that individuals with 
two children should pay $199 less than those with no children. When 
Table 4 Variation in Expert-Specific Affordability Scores across  
61 Vignette Cases. 
 Experts with Significant  Experts with Significant 
 Positive Coefficient Negative Coefficient
  Effect on  Effect on 
  average  average 
  monthly  monthly 
 Number  affordability Number affordability 
 of experts score of experts score
Income (dollars) 16 0.2 0 
Single 10 67.7 2 –266.4
Two children 0 0 9a –198.5
(Single) × (two kids) 3 74.4 5 –151.6
Plan A 0 0 16 –80.9
Debt 1 23.6 2 –52.0
Savings 4 32.2 1 –19.3
Child from previous relationship 0 0 6 –54.5
Spouse does not work 3 47.0 1 –19.2
Did not graduate HS 1 41.2 2 –30.1
Graduated college 2 237.7 0 0
Excellent health 2 131.8 0 0
Asthma 1 49.1 4 –35.8
Hypertension 1 48.0 1 –56.4
Chicago 1 390.7 1 –769.1
Iowa City 1 124.8 1 –174.0
Austin 1 233.3 1 –487.4
Drive to work 2 213.0 3 –48.5
Owns home 1 0.5 0 0
Notes: Each column presents the number of experts with a significantly positive or nega-
tive coefficient and the overall magnitude of the effect on the affordability score. We show 
only those experts whose scores were statistically significant. It should be kept in mind that 
this does not mean that the other experts did not assign a higher or lower score to any given 
vignette characteristic. 
aFor instance, nine experts strongly felt that the presence of two children in the household 
means that the vignette character’s health insurance payments should be lower than a household 
with no children.
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single marital status is interacted with children, three experts felt that a 
single parent with two children should be penalized (i.e., payment should 
increase), whereas five experts believed payments should be reduced.
Only a small number of experts believed the following factors should be 
taken into account in setting monthly payment levels: debt (three experts), 
savings (five), educational attainment (two), children from previous mar-
riage (six), unemployed spouse (four), a commute to work requiring a car 
(five), the presence of preexisting conditions (asthma, five, hypertension, 
two), geographic location cost- of- living adjustments (two), and home own-
ership (one). Some of these scores reflect subsidies that are particularly 
large in magnitude (large subsidies or large payment increases). As illus-
trated above in reporting qualitative findings from the in- person discus-
sion, when experts discussed the use of these factors to determine afford-
ability levels, where considered appropriate, such factors were typically 
seen as incentives for good social behavior (through rewards or penalties) 
or as behavior- neutral, with the factors simply placing individuals in dis-
advantaged positions, thereby making them worthy of increased subsidies. 
For instance, graduation from high school or college can be seen as an 
indicator of future prosperity. One respondent thought that high school 
dropouts should pay more and two thought that they should pay less.
Table 5 builds on table 4 to show the number of significant coefficients 
per expert respondent. Thus, while table 4 shows the variation in charac-
teristics considered significant, table 5 shows the variation in character-
istics seen as significant by each expert. For instance, expert number 17 
felt that eleven characteristics were important to consider, but expert 18 
felt that only two were important to consider. This table also shows the 
direction of the response. For example, expert 1 felt that six characteris-
tics should merit a higher subsidy and four characteristics should lower 
the subsidy. There was a wide range of variation in this respect as well, 
with five experts providing more positive scores, four providing an equal 
number of positive and negative scores, and nine providing more negative 
scores than positive ones.
However, when one looks at the frequency of factors that experts felt 
should be significant, a different picture emerges (see fig. 2). On aver-
age, experts believe 6.5 adjustments should be taken into account when 
setting subsidy levels, and a clear majority of experts (fifteen out of eigh-
teen) believe a standard should include five adjustments or more (up to a 
maximum of eleven adjustments). Thus, while the significance for any one 
adjustment (see table 4) suggests that most experts do not believe many 
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adjustments (aside from income and plan design) should be taken into 
account, figure 2 suggests otherwise. In fact, these experts believe quite a 
few adjustments should be taken into account in setting subsidy levels, but 
disagree about which particular factors should be used.
Discussion
Among of the expert panel there were substantial variations in assess-
ments of the affordability of health insurance and the mix of elements 
that should be included in setting an affordability standard. The expert 
panel even disagreed about what affordability actually means, with some 
interpreting it as what one “could” pay and others what one “should” pay. 
The expert panel also held relatively fixed notions of what the affordability 
Table 5 Number of Statistically Significant Affordability Scores 
(Positive and Negative) Assigned to Vignette Character Characteristics 
for Each Expert.
 Number of  Number of 
Expert Positive Scores Negative Scores
 1 6 4
 2 3 5
 3 3 4
 4 4 4
 5 8 2
 6 1 4
 7 3 4
 8 2 4










Notes: The values reflect the number of positive coefficients for any given vignette trait 
(e.g., income) based on individual regressions. Thus the affordability scores from respondent 
18 were only significant for two vignette characteristics. The expert felt that the affordability 
score should be higher for one of these traits and lower for the other trait.
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standard should be; after discussing the need to define affordability as a 
normative concept, most experts did not change their rating of how much 
the vignette characters should pay for each of the different health insur-
ance plans.
In their discussions, experts were sparing in taking into account most 
living circumstances other than household income and family size. Those 
who thought additional factors should be considered were highly divided 
about whether policies should incentivize good behavior or simply redis-
tribute income to people in various disadvantaged positions. In discus-
sions at the in- person meeting, respondents voiced concern about both the 
potential for unintended distortionary effects from taking into account 
factors such as debt or living expenses and the administrative complexity 
of doing so. Likewise, in the formal Delphi analysis scoring process, only 
a minority of respondents saw such factors as significant considerations in 
their affordability scoring. However, these data mask the fact that many 
experts did in fact want additional adjustments (see fig. 2), but the specific 
adjustments desired varied considerably. It is tempting to speculate that 
such adjustments varied according to this same trade- off between indi-
vidual incentives and net social- welfare benefits.
For most experts, fundamental differences in what affordability means, 
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as well as their assessment of the basic bundle of goods that public policy 
should assure low- income people have, trumped nuanced arguments about 
particular behavioral dimensions. This, combined with the substantial 
variation in affordability scores and affordability determinations beyond 
household income relative to the FPL, suggests that affordability is at its 
core a political concept.
Given that notions of affordability are inherently normative, our find-
ings raise questions surrounding the extent to which mainstream public 
values align with those of experts. In cost- effectiveness analysis used in 
medicine, it is necessary to elicit preferences to quantify the morbidity 
associated with a given health state, such as blindness (Gold et al. 1996). 
For this task, a U.S. government panel, employing a Rawlsian framework, 
decided it was best not to elicit such preferences from experts or even 
from patients suffering from the condition but rather from a representative 
sample of the population. The idea behind this decision was that, since 
cost- effectiveness analysis is used to allocate tax dollars for the benefit of 
everyone, everyone in society should decide how different health states 
are valued. Indeed, the scores estimated by experts look quite different 
from those elicited from the general public (Gold and Muennig 2002). 
However, experts bring to the table a much more nuanced understand-
ing of the implications of competing alternative policies, and there is no 
gold standard to assess which choice is best under any given set of cir-
cumstances. Indeed, data from our public sample of affordability scores 
suggest that, among other issues, most people have very little idea what 
their employers pay for their premiums (Muennig et al.). A separate public 
sample was obtained and is discussed elsewhere (ibid.).
Limitation
This study was limited by the sample size and composition; we present 
the opinions and affordability scores of just eighteen experts. While these 
experts were chosen from a broad range of disciplinary backgrounds, it is 
difficult to assess the extent to which their ideas are representative of other 
expert panels used to make public policy.
Conclusion
There is not a natural, objective standard of affordable health insurance 
coverage. Of course this is true for most (if not all) policies that require 
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government subsidies. Reasonable people disagree about how much a 
given household can be expected to put aside to spend on health insur-
ance and health care.
That there is considerable disagreement even among distinguished 
experts in social policy on this issue suggests that the concept is mainly 
a subjective one and that any specific affordability threshold or subsidy 
structure is likely to be contentious and contested. In this area, as with 
many others, even highly qualified experts are unlikely to provide scien-
tific answers to guide policy.
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